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On the 17 May 1946, East London [E.L.] witnessed the start of its
biggest strike in 15 years. 'Don't offload the ships' was the
call, low wages the initial issue, and the key actors were about
400 'casual' workers at the E.L. docks. On a piece of open ground
overlooking the port, their 'union hall' for the next month, the
workers held day long meetings, reinforcing and emphasizing
solidarity and unity under the auspices of a flexible and dynamic
strike committee. Loading and off-loading at the Buffalo Harbour
was brought to a standstill.1
During the course of the strike attempts to replace the striking
workers with graving dock construction workers, and thereafter,
v.ith other locally employed S.A.R.& H. workers, failed. These
workers, who refused to replace the striking workers, demonstrated
a remarkable degree of collective identification and support,
themselves, being dismissed and joining the strike.2 Attempts to
divide and break the strike by the Harbour Administration, through
offering regular employment to 80 of the strikers, were also
rejected and defeated. The 21 May saw a march to the Systems
Manager's office in town, extending the activities and action of
the strike. In June, links between the strikers and the local
Communist Party, and with CNETl1, were established. But links also
existed between some of the workers and Kadalie's ICU.3 At a C.P.
meeting in the East Bank Location on the 9 June this link with the
strikers was voiced, and thereafter meetings in the location called
for 'solidarity with our comrades', and a desire to extend both the
strike, and through it, worker organization in E.L. Flyers calling
on strike-breakers not to 'scab' were also issued by the C.P. 1
We have here the 'classic' ingredients of working class
consciousness, action, and organization. And yet this event falls
into E.L.'s history as a 'festival of the oppressed', it is not
repeated, sustained, or even apparently extended and deepened.
There is not another strike of its size, scope, or duration for
another 20 years. The strike ends by the middle of June, with re-
instatement and a limited wage increase. CNETU, despite 1916 claims
of 10 unions and a 15 000 worker membership, appears never to grow
beyond 'a few thousand', and by 1951, it, together with the local
C.P., has collapsed.5 Despite significant support for the ANC in
the 1950-1952 period, it too suffers significant setbacks and
massive decline in it's organizational expression after the '1952
riots'.
But does the lack of organization, and class-based collective
action mean that E.L. was silent for more than a decade? Was there
no struggle, no resistance, no motor-force of development and
contradiction in E.L.'s workplaces?
In examining the nature of East London's social and economic his-
tory during the 1950's ,the problem of it's regional specificity,
against national processes becomes apparent. Economically East
London developed as a trading port, and up until the 1930's was
1 Daily Dispatch, East London, 17 May-11 June 1946.
2 Daily Dispatch, 20 May 1946.
3 Smith,H.H. ; The Development of Labour Organization in East
London, 1900-1948. M Econ Thesis, Rhodes University, 1949.
pp.185-201 .
4 Ibid. p.204.
5 Border Chamber of Industries [BCI], File 26.
dominated by commercial capital. This economic dominance was
reflected in local politics and refracted in the local state, which
was seen as 'strongly traditional, ... caught in a time-warp', as
it actively opposed 'the unsightly curse of the modern factory'.6
The subsequent lack of 'industrial facilities' meant that the
19-10's and early 1950's was marked by a weal; industrial locational
structure, a hostile local state caught up in tourism and trade,
and active discouragement of investment, whether local or
international, by the resident dominant class. These barriers were
underpinned by a practically non-existent raw material base, and a
weal; regional market structure, tied into the Ciskei and Transkei
' reserves'.
The period cl9I0 to cl963 was marked by the transitionary nature
of East London's economy from a commercial and small workshop
manufacturing centr? to a city reflecting the dominance of
manufacturing capital, albeit hesitantly, haltingly, and tenuously.
In order to examine this process and draw out the nature of local
class formation, the historical local meanings of work, and to
suggest the manner in which East London was shaped by these
material changes [and continuities], however, we first need some
still-life structural photographs of this economy, [in terms of
growth of manufacturing and decline of commercial capital, sector
dominance, employment and wages, output, and capital intensity].
In East London the number of manufacturing industries increased
from 135 in 1945/6; to 223 in 1959/60. In the same period net out-
put increased dramatically Iby 211%, 92% in real terms], as did the
value and extent of capital investment in land, buildings, and
machinery.7
By the mid-1950's E.L. was dominated by four main sectors - food,
textiles, chemicals, and construction. Together they accounted for
72% of net output in 1960 [102 firms [46% of all firms] of which 54
were construction, 31 food, 12 chemicals, and 5 textiles], and
together employed 68% of the industrial workforce.
The labour force in private industry increased from 6 325 [2 526
white] in 1946 to 13 002 [4 281 white] in 1960. The black labour
force had increased from 3 800 to 8 721, and many of these workers
were located in operative and semi-skilled jobs. At the same time
employment in commerce, while still significant, had only increased
from 2 730 to 4 450 black workers. Members of the emerging black
working class employed in the S.A.R.&H.[2310 in 1960] and by the
local state [2130 in 1960] remained relatively stable through the
1950's. This trend in employment patterns, while indicative of the
growing dominance of manufacturing industry, should not mask the
continuing importance of the commercial and state sectors in
shaping local class relations.
The design of manufacturing capital shows a further internal sec-
toral division of labour in the dominance of the four sectors,
three of which [the exception being construction] demonstrate
6 BCI, Box 8, Correspondence.
7 These statistics that follow are drawn from the following
sources: Barker, J.P. , Industrial Development in a Border
Area, 1966 ; Hobart-Houghton, D. [ed.], Economic Development
in a PLural Society, 1960 ; from unpublished census
statistics, and from BCI and Company records.
significant growth in the period up until 1957, but in different
ways and with different consequences. The food industry was the
most stable, and the most long-standing, developing in the 1920's
and 1930's. In 1946 it accounted for 27% of total net output, and
in I960, 30%. Concerned more with processing than actual
manufacture [with the notable exception of Wilson Rowntree and the
milling companies], the period reflected processes of expansion
amongst existing 'factories' rather than significant new factory
investments. The labour force increased from 1 715 [795 black] in
19-46, to 3 932 [2 987 black] in the sector by I960, largely
consisting of unskilled packers and labourers, but also operatives
on sweet and other smaller processing production lines.
The second key sector was the textile industry, whose output value
equalled 23% of E.L.'s total in 1960 [increased from 9% to 23% in
the period 1950 to I960]. In the textile sector the level of con-
centration was reflected in the presence of 5 largo [monopoly]
firms [as against 28 in the food sector] together with it's output
and employment importance. What was significant in textiles was the
recent development [post 1915] of three of the five firms, all
involving international capital investment, and their relative
advancement in technological capacity and production processes.
This impacted on the nature of the labour force which increased
from 881 [570 black] in 1916 to 2 018 [1 559 black] in 1960, all
located in semi-skilled operative positions.
The same pattern can be identified in the third important sector,
chemicals. Geared more towards the consumer goods, than the capital
goods market, and centred on twelve concerns, [but dominated by
five], the sector was responsible for 15% of output in 1957/8. This
importance needs to be situated in the context of two processes;
the closure of an industrial chemical plant in 1956, and a drastic
decline in productivity in the post 1957 period where by 1960 this
sector only accounted for 8% of E.L.'s net output. This was
reflected in employment patterns, where in 1960 only 512 people
were employed [286 black] as compared to the 352 [181 black] of
1946. The early 1960's witnessed significant 'administrative
changes and industrial restructuring', and productivity increased
dramatically to pre-1956 levels by 1963/1, however, as did employ-
ment, climbing to 952 in that year. Importantly though, this was
one of only two sectors where white and black employment size
remained relatively equal.
The construction sector on the other hand, while centrally related
to the massive post-1915 boom, was dominated by over fifty small
competitive and sub-contracting firms, and was extensively labour-
intensive and vulnerable to economic fluctuation. Its percentage of
net output declined from 16% in 1950, to 10% in 1960, reflecting
the correlation pf the sector to declining and stagnant growth in
the industrial sector generally, as the 1950's progressed, and in
the post 1957 period in particular. The number of workers increased
from 1 115 [819 black] in 1946 to 1 661 [1 137 black] in 1960, and
engaged in heavy and demanding manual labour, experientally very
different from the textile and even food sectors. But in other
important respects it was comparable, especially in racial terms of
definition.
A fifth major growth sector was that of transport, equally domi-
nated by small-scale service competitors [46 establishmerits in
1954], except for CD.A [and John Brown Tractors], which as a major
automobile producer, became one of E.L.'s key manufacturing indus-
tries in the late 1950's.
Lastly the weakness of the engineering and metal industrial sector
needs to be identified. Together the general engineering [dominated
•' by electrical engineering and two battery companies-Raylite and
Chloride], and the metal products industries contributed only 13.6%
of total net output in 1960 in E.L. This reflected an increase of
i) less than 1% from 19-16, and in reality a significant decrease,
•' given the importance of the two battery factories established in
the 1950's. This absence of any real local capital base influenced
E.L.'s industrial and class structure in particular ways. These
industries were important employers of labour however, with the
1916 figure of 865 workers [494 black] increasing to 1 631 [1.0C9
black] in 1960, many of which were new semi-skilled operatives.
Two important processes need to be identified out of the employment
and wages statistics. The divisions of labour in racial and gender
terms underwent significant change. A dramatic process of
substitution and incorporation of black operative for white
artisanal and operative labour took place. Male white workers moved
significantly into supervisory positions [increasingly through the
1950's and rapidly after 1956] and female white workers moved
rapidly into [after 1945] and out of [from the mid 1950's] the
productive labour force. This impacted regionally in a very high
percentage of black [almost exclusively male] workers located in
operative, skilled and semi-skilled positions, as well as
constituting a larger percentage of the industrial workforce than
in other regions, and nationally. Racial class tensions marked
every step of these processes of giving content, structure and
meaning to manufacturing work in East London, particularly as the
1950's progressed.
Wages and wage levels in the manufacturing industries were also
starkly divided in racial terms. Black wage levels were lower than
national averages by about 20%.8 Although this percentage decreased
in the 1955-1960 period.it stabilized at this 20% level again after
1963. This meant that wages, while significantly higher than 1915
levels, were still extremely low, while comparisons to white work
and white workers wages generally, made them glaringly inadequate
and discriminatory.
Behind these statistics, are three trends that need exploration:
East London's position in the South African economy, the uneven
nature of industrialization, and its weak structural base. In terms
of manufacturing production, E.L.'s position nationally is
marginal. In 1960 it produced barely 2% of national output,
despite having registered the highest growth rate in S.A. in the
1946-1954 period. This weak base meant that patterns of
industrialization occuring in East London were at once more re-
sponsive to local conditions, and less integrated into national and
central state interventions promoting manufacturing development.
Essentially East London's manufacturing sector developed in stops
and starts. It did not clearly reflect a simple or automatic
linear progression of a declining commercial, and emergent
manufacturing capital, becoming increasingly concentrated and domi-
nant. Rather, accompanying the decline of the 'vested wholesale in-
8 Drawn from the same sources as note 7 above.
terests1, which had continually dominated in the boom periods of
the 1930's and 1940's [1934-1946/7] was an intense and at tines
contradictory conflict over the shape of the local economy, and
control of the local state. This was important as the local 'lords
of the seas' ruled against import substitution industries on aty
significant scale in this period. The textile, motor assembly,
food, chemical and other industries which did locate in E.L., did
so in spite of a fragile local base and infrastructure, and an
unsupportive politically organized dominant commercial class.9 And
pai-t of their necessary project of establishing the 'rijb/t
conditions for modern business', was a political project of re-
drawing lines of- class and ensuring that beyond the concerns of
electricity, rail links, water, and industrial land [the landscape
of manufacture] there was a 'sympathetic mayor...fand J...a council
of industry.'10 Objectives, however, proved easier to writ.? in
reports and communicate in board and chamber meetings, than to
create on public platforms and establish amongst the fragmented
manufacturers, let alone the 'loyal citizens of trade*
The particular trend of industrialization then, meant secondly that
East London was characterized by a highly uneven pattern c f
development. Simultaneous to the investment of Rownlrees, C.D.A-,
Johnson and Johnson, and other largely British aulti-nationols, tas
the emergence of a host of small workshop and individual mamifac—
turing concerns in the food, footwear, clothing, wood, transports
electrical goods, and construction sectors. In between, and ranging
in size and productive capacity were the local, national and
international factories, largely competitive in the textile, chemi-
cal, food, furniture, transport and engineering •arkets, and rel-
atively labour intensive in production. Khile levels of local in-
tegration remained weak, it is important to locate the combined
nature of E.L.'s industrialization process which provided the Mar-
kets, labour-power, infrastructure and capital access for small
manufacturers to mushroom, in the post 1945 period.
In terms of economic growth, E.L.'s manufacturing sector expanded
dramatically in the 1946-1956 period, but thereafter, in the 1957-
1961/2 period, there was 'a decline in the average value of iin-
dustrial output for establishments'. The stagnant nature of tte
manufacturing sector was reflected in declining net outputs,
marginal investments in plant and machinery, a largely unsuccessful
drive to expand consumer markets, and centrally a problematic and
uncompetitive local productivity of labour.11 This period exposed
[in all of the above ways], the real weaknesses of this phase of
E.L.'s import substitution industrialization, centred on ligh.1.
semi-manufactured and non-durable consumer goods, and largcEi"
labour -intensive relations of production. The regional market was
'rapidly saturated... despite the enormous potential market of the
Kaffir Territories ' and the 'unwillingness of the nati\re to securer
a decent livelihood ...through industry's wide open doors'. This>
was but the entry point to struggles over the nature and meaning
of work and labour productivity.12 Issues of control, discipline
and consent were all pervasive in the consciousness of the
9 BCI, Box 8, Correspondence.
10 BCI, Box 10, Unsorted.
11 BCI, Reports for the years 1940-1961; Company Archives
consulted in December 1986 and 1987.
12 BCI, Box 10, Letter to the BCI from local textile
manufacturer, March 1948.
manufacturers as they struggled to regulate wages and ensure in-
creasing output, and attempted to enlarge and 'create' textile,
food, soap, furniture and glass product markets.13
The picture that emerges is one structured around a weak consumer
goods industry susceptible to market fluctuation, the lack of a
capital goods sector and heavy industry, the dominance of
competitive capital, and the necessity to restructure relations of
production, especially in the context of the late 1950's
stagnation, and the related lack of a 'suitable' manufacturing
working class.
CHEAP LABOUR, AND THE QUESTION OF 'THE NATIVE WORKER*
"There exists at present [cl950] a class of non-white
industrial labour which is cheap, hard-working, courteous
and efficient. Present conditions indicate it is
available in unlimited supplies and is a great boon to
the economic attractiveness and growth of the city."14
Local investment and industrial expansion had followed
the perceived advantages of a growing infrastructure and improved
port, but central to practically all the entrepeneurial spirit of
'profit with progress* expressed by big and small manufacturers
alike, was the expectant exploitability and readiness of a 'job
hungry mass of cheap kaffir labour ..., who will learn to spend
their earnings in the proper manner'.15 This presumption of docile,
but willing black workers eagerly, learning new skills and values,
and thankfully taking home small pay packets, dominated industry
and company consciousness in the 1946-1956 period.In part this was
shaped, and conditioned by the hard reality of the
"weakness of the white in numerical strength in East
London...his attachment to his craft...and his
• unwillingness to work below his dignity...The future of
the white must lie in the overseeing of new kinds and a
different form of labour"16
Equally significant, though, was the nature of the ideological
struggle amongst the varied brokers of differing industrial 'camps'
about the form and meaning of work in racial and occupational
terms. The company records paint a picture of tension and and
contradiction in this period. Khile some of the larger companies,
and most of the new ones, attempted to implement mass production
using African labour (and some Coloured workers in the food sector]
from the beginning, many of the smaller and longer established
firms grappled with the ideas of re-drawing racial lines of work.
The regard was that the 'honest, hard-working craftsman will be no
more', replaced by 'a mob of no-works natives'. At the same time,
opposition and anger would be effected from unemployed, threatened
and replaced white workers. The process of 'uplifting the native
and giving him the basis to demand more and more' also opened the
13 BCI, Box 10.
14 Brochure published by the City Council and the SAR&H
Administration, 1950.
15 BCI, Files 23 and 24.
16 BCI, File 25.
way for higher wages, unions, and 'a stake in the city', all
undesirable repercussions of employing 'native labour'.17
The ranks of industrial and manufacturing capital in E.L. sere
split around sympathy and support for one of three broad positions,
although not in necessarily exclusive and hardened ways. The
grouping which supported and most actively articulated a free
labour capitalist ideology, materialized around mass production and
the .labour of black workers, and was located•in the new and larger
textile, food, electrical goods and automobile factories. It was
these factories which were acutely sensitive to the form and need
of low cost labour, despite their size and high comparative level
of technology/investment. A second less coherent grouping emerged
around smaller firms concerned with competitive expansion and ne*r
market penetration, but constrained by lack of capital and white
semi-skilled high wages, and by the weak 'purchasing power' of "the
natives'. A number of spokesmen took the stage, arguing for
substitution and the need of black labour in almost the same breatii
as seeking to protect 'jobs for whites' in strict racially
hierarchical workplaces. Lastly, the small workshops and service
industries, the artisanal preserve of E.L., together with the con-
struction industry, represented the most racist and exclusive, yet
ambiguously materially distilled position of defending the use of
black labour. It was 'cheap' and 'ideally suited to dirty and hard
manual work', and also in the context of white labour shortages,
black workers could do the jobs of whites, but for lower wages and
with far less workplace power.18
At the same time the pressure*; for keeping the labour force white
was historically rooted in the 1930's and sustained in the 1910's
and early 1950's in E.L. Conceptions about the advantages of, and
pressures from white labour shaped the way management thought,,
initiated and organized production on a basis that continued to
prioritize their role. The notions that white labour was best were
strongly and articulately held; it was more disciplined, intelli-
gent, and responsive to management's needs, while black labour was
the reverse for many industrialists. In particular, small, local,
and transforming capital in manufacture sensed and argued that with
white labour, relations were not only exploitative, but importantly
'filled with agreement and acceptance*. Consent and mutual benefits
patterned production undertaken by white workers, craft and
operative, in terms of higher wages, job protection and security,
transport, canteen, and housing facilities, pensions and in-
surance. 19 In return, the factory and the workplace where white
labour dominated, was stable and productive, at least in the
1940's. But the consent of the 1940's began to fragment in ti»e
1950's, from both sides, with the pressures of limited availability
of white labour, expansion and new production techniques, the need
for new consumer markets, and the necessity of cutting production
labour costs. These were all felt, and experienced to various
degrees by the majority of local white workers in the workplaces as
increasingly new faces and hands were black.20
17 BCI, File 24.
18 BCI, Boxes 4-6. Company archives, 1987.
19 Company archives, Dec.1987; Interviews with companies
Jan.1987.
20 Company archives, Dec.1987., BCI Box 5,
The question of the local labour market, and the employment of
black labour as necessary, and for mass production as it began to
take shape, vital, implied an acceptance that was at. best, amongst
the other two groupings, partial and incomplete. It was opposed,
,j questioned and restricted around the issues of what constituted
'native labour'and its employment and skill level, how to answer
the problems of a limited white labour force, and; the extent of
moral obligation and productive value to protect 'poor whites' and
i. 'white work',as well as how divisions of labour, in workplaces
{' should be organized. Integrated against rigidly hierarchical,
entirely white or black factory floors, and supervisory and
operative divisions, all were optionally debated and loudly
proclaimed as solutions by local capitalists.
So too was the issue of white worker opposition, fear, and hostil-
ity, and the power of union organization in the 1950's, influential
in creating discoid and preventing the emergence of a unified
capitalist ideology and strategy in E.L.21 Resignations based on
the employment of 'kaffir labour' in firms, the threatened walkout
if a newly hired black worker was not dismissed in an assembly
plant, and the actual physical assaults on African workers all
indicated the way power flowed in the factories, as did the cross-
racial threats, the sabotaging of black workers' machines, and the
demands for segregated work-areas, toilets, breaks, and starting
and ending times.22 This all made production, and control of the
labour-process tense and demanding, and substitution explosive. The
fear of black workers was structured in broader political terms,
expressed through the ANC, the defiance campaign, and in the
impermanence of community life in the townships. It was generally
accepted that 'East London was not a city of strikes and
disputes'23 and it was the question of migrancy that was of deeper
concern, as it was recognized by the 'free labour capitalists' that
"the full commitment of native labour to an industrial
society as is developing in E.L. requires and demands a
complete break with tribal affiliations and the system of
migrant labour...The presence and perpetuation of a dual
society is an obstacle in the path of rapid
development."24
But the ideologues of mass production, who by 1952 dominated the
Border Chamber of Industries, were not magicians and a statement of
intent did not carry locally universal desires. For many firms mi-
grancy was the 'most suitable form of native labour' throughout the
1950's, and as such defended 'tooth and nail', in chamber meetings
and at work.25
An equal number of 'industrialists', and in particular the small
firms, were also opposed to 'permanent native residents', as were
the commercial brokers. Migrancy enabled greater control, lower
wages and reproduction costs, and a 'clean and trouble-free city',
as well as a 'more humble and obedient servant'.
On the factory floors of East London these debates and conceptions
played themselves out in a different dynamic, supplying significant
21 Company records, Dec.1988., BCI File 38.
22 BCI Files 38-40 'Details of industrial conflict*.
23 LIE EL 4/8/7/3.
24 Industrial report, BCI File 27.
25 BCI Boxes 11-13,
shaping pressures on the nature of capitalism locally, from below.
The broad acceptance of using and abusing 'cheap native labour',if
in markedly different forms and dimensions amongst capitalists, did
not mean black workers flocked through the gates, stabilized and
skilled themselves, and got on with the job.Neither did it lean
white workers felt secure and protected, simply 'going with the
waves of change'.26
The newly discovered black worker was, in the early 1950's, unre-
sponsive to the moulds laid so difficultly by management's ideo-
logical brokers. There was no 'easy' second or third generation
workforce, no pre-existing pattern and culture of capitalist vork
and skill-, no clear-cut seperation from the land, no unambiguous
conception of private property, not ever, the necessary acceptance
of alienated industrial time,-in East London in the 1950's.
The Market Square Bus Terminus on any Friday afternoon in the er.rly
1950's: jostling queues of people and parcels, overcrowded buses,
the destinations of Kwelegha, Keiskammahoek, and Mount Frere
reaffirming old and generating new contacts and unities,
discussions and realities. Of these migrants, weekly, fortnightly,
and monthly E.L. workers going 'home' to the Ciskei and Transkei
for the weekend, many would return 'in time', but many would not be
outside the factories and workshops on Monday mornings, taking
advantage of 'our time, not the whitemans''.27
For many of these migrants, wage labour was an attempt to
"...get enough to get back to what was important for
me... I grew up on the land and then I worked here at
different places to earn money to plant and build up my
farm... later that all changed and I had to work here to
earn a living and I lost sight of the land"28
In this sense wages, their value and their relationship to the na-
ture of work, were constantly played off against not just the
remembered, but the actual possibilities of rural production,
making dipping-tanks as important as drive-shafts for more than 50%
of E.L.'s workers in 1952/53. The imprecise, convoluted, and
tenuous links that characterized the seperation of about 85% of
E.L.'s workers from rural realities as 'partial', were felt
directly in the workplaces. 29
"Ninety percent of the natives are worse than useless...
they should be kicked out...their attachments in the
Kaffir Terratories, their concern with their fields...
and ploughing holidays, as well as the irregular and
constant movement to and fro makes them the worst workers
I've ever come across...the respect held for a job in
town is nothing compared to the worth shown their rural
existence... I cannot run my business like this and I am
not alone, not by any means."30
The problem was not so much migrant labour itself, which suited
many businesses in E.L. in wage and reproductive cost cutting, but
26 LIE EL 4/8/7/3.
27 Interviews, June and Dec. 1987 with a number of workers of the
1950's.
28 Interview 3, E, June 1987.
29 BCI File 27.
30 BCI File 28.
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in its unstable and uncontrollable nature. This was reflected in a
massive labour turnover, where 25% of workers had been employed for
less than three months and 56% for two years or Jess, 31 in the
dominant form of weekly migration [as opposed to monthly or longer]
out of the city, in 'absenteeism', and in that
"the native has no understanding of "modern time...he will
arrive late, leave early, not work on Mondays... the time
spent on work is probably only half of what it should
be"32 .
The contradictory nature of structuring the blacl; working class in
E.L. was acutely felt in the distance with which many black workers
valued the workplace. Workers changed jobs because of a myriad of
indetectable reasons, but two broad processes emerge as major
e.\planotions: bad working conditions and low wages, and the sus-
taining [if declining] realities of rural life. Workers complained
that work 'starts too early and coldly', that work was too exacting
and treatment was 'bad, like rubbish' and of being paid 'nothing
wages'. One worker left work because he became tired of riding a
bicycle, another because of the 'language of the sjambok', a third
because he 'needed a rest at home',and others because they had to
plough, harvest or marry.33 These worlds of labour, the factory,
the railway shed, the backyard, and their unsuitability and
instability of occupation, meant that the pick and shovel railway
worker was as likely as the engineer-ing machine operator, the
weaver as likely as the stevedore worker, to share the designs and
engage in the patterns of resisting proletarianization. The
perceived black working class did not materialize to fill even
those factories where they were accepted and expected.
For the white working class the whole nature and direction of
struggle had assumed a different character. The 1920's and 1930's
had seen the occupational and 'traditional' craft based working
class 'opened up' by small-scale industrialization in E.L.34 By
the second World War all skilled and semi-skilled work in industry
was held by white workers. This was to change. A key process was
the ability, often linked to necessity, of white workers to
redefine their position in the workplaces of the 1950's.35 This
meant that while some of the joiners, moulders, and cutters held
onto their skills in food, engineering and clothing, others,
increasingly, were forced to accept or initiate re-definitions
which involved de-skilling and the uneasy transition from artisan
to industrial worker with different skills, responsibilities, and
workplace experiences.
A different process of white working class formation, centred
around recently proletarianized, largely Afrikaans speakers,
struggling into E.L. from the Transkei and Ciskei in particular,
also took shape. Many in desperation, found themselves shoulder-to-
shoulder with African manual workers 'like ants ' in the construc-
tion of the new port facilities in the 1930's.36 Gradually this
31 Ibid.
32 Letter dated Jan.1951, Company Records.
33 Interview 3, G, June 1987., Daily Dispatch, Feb. 1951. See
also Mayer, P., Townsmen or Tribesmen, Oxford, 19C1, pp.2-l-'25.
34 Hobart Houghton, op cit, ch.10.
35 Company Reports Dec. 1986., also Smith, H.H., op. cit. chs.l-
3.
36 Daily Dispatch, October 1937.
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contact began to break in the manufacturing and commercial spheres,
but as more open competition and hostility for a place in the new
labour markets.37 The fight for segregated workplaces and
protected jobs voiced in the unions! in local Afrikaner Nationalist
bodies, and in the homes, churches and clubs, pressed on
pressurized craft workers, and on local capitalists in the 19-10's
and early 1950's. The gradual inter-facing of declining artisanal
and rising manufacturing, service, and commercial work, redefined
work expectations. The implications of this re-making of the white
working class in the 1950's meant that workers began to 'weigh the
relative advantages of employment in commerce and unskilled work',
in 'positions conveniently located in matters of wages, welfare,
and employment policies, in security prospects, in attractiveness
or otherwise of general working conditions, and in various social
aspects attached to particular- employments'. Centrally, factory em-
ployment became identified as 'beneath the dignity and standing' of
both white male and.female workers. To be an operative or a manual
worker was to be black. The 'correct position' for white male
workers was in 'the overseeing and supervising of native labour'38
This increasing rigidity with which white work was being defined,
from below, meant that
"employers have to face the fact that they are unable to
entice white labour into such activities as sweetmaking,
or the manufacture of clothing or textiles or shoes on
the scale they would like and the decreasing numbers
means adapting their production accordingly, white women
are better, more industrious and self-disciplined than
men, and are more reliable because they don't need
supervision the way other races do. But they don't stay
long in their jobs...In a word jobs are looking for
workers rather than workers looking for jobs.The answer
lies in native replacement."39
Significantly, though, this re-definition was uneven and far from
complete by the mid-1950's. Workers, white men and women, continued
to find themselves in food, chemical, clothing, and in engineering,
paint and timber works as semi-skilled and operative labour. This
entailed that their workplaces simmered with tensions and
conflicts. Poor work quality and ineffeciency, absenteeism and
drunkeness, as well as open racial antagonism became expressions of
deeper class frustations of 'stagnation and immobility'. These
white workers forced into factories and operative/manual positions
were often seen as 'the desperate and unintelligent... weak in head
and spirit', entering into unwanted and lowly-defined jobs by their
fellow workers, and this hurt and angered. As they came in-
creasingly under the varied strengths of capitals' spotlights in
the mid-1950's, employers big and small began questioning the via-
bility of unsuitable and untrained workers, and the fact that
'progressive upward movements of whites enabled less qualified
white labour also to move upward1.
The needs and expectations that significantly altered E.L.'s eco-
nomic development were the apparent availability of cheap and
docile black labour. This allowed for significant profitability and
37 Interviews 2, D and E, June 1987., BCI Box 13.
38 Hobart Houghton, op.cit., p.219, BCI Box 13, contains the same
information.
39 BCI Box 13.
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was the central locational/expansion factor for industrialists in
the 1946-1953/4 period. The 1950's however, proved that
availability was not effort or output, and location not production
or profit on any simple one to one basis. Black workers struggled
not only for wage increases and political voice, but against their
very entry and expected routines and practices of exploitation in
the workplaces of E.L.
Pre-industrial work habits had a profoundly contradictory effect on
work and the factories of E.L. While the frequent changing of jobs
was seen as 'undignified, unmanly, and possibly displeasing to the
spirits', the 'heavy, demanding, and lowly paid white woil;1
emphasized necessary avoidance, evasion and opposition to the same
work. Caught in the tension between the possibility of 'witch'
attacks, focussed on a thriving family and herd [attacks via envy]
and translated uneasily into successful wage labour, [which was
itself 'breaking tradition and entering an alien white man's
world'and therefore opening oneself to attack more easily], and
angering the spirits through labour mobility and ^ changing jobs,
workers desperately clung to the rural areas in whatever way
possible, as a satisfactory link to the ancestors, and as
'protection from harm'.-10
Work patterns were also different. The time, speed, and rhythm of
seasons and ploughs, was replaced by the sweat, heat, tiredness and
strain of mechanized and heavy, repetitive manual work, and it was
resisted and evaded as far as possible. Complex arrangements of
rest, slow work, managed machine faults and breakdowns, and
'looking for rests in the work' through constant job movement and
regular migration, patterned experiences and reflected the alien-
ated nature of 'white work'. The loss of 'managing one's own life'
and of having to labour in 'the white man's world' was doubly felt
as a removal of independent rural and personal control over work
and production, and of having to increasingly rely on those 'who
took my life away in the first place and axe now doing it again in
spirit and manliness in work not fit for men.'41 This, equally, af-
fected the degree of incorporation and acceptance of wage labour in
E.L. in the 1950's, and its avoidance.42
The manner in which 'the manliness' of male workers was affected in
wage labour, influenced a consciousness of work which was re-
flective of a deeper reality of the nature of 'industrial' work. No
longer directed and controlled by the same men, not only did the
nature of work change but also the content. The African men, forced
into wage labour, could no longer rely on the labour of wives and
'juniors', as in the rural areas, and found the pressures of long,
continuous and seemingly never-ending occupation at the various
points of production very different to the gender divided and male
controlled practices of the Ciskei and Transkei rural relations of
production. More, 'harder' and different work, and diminishing
control and ability to influence their own participation in it,
engendered a hostility to 'independent women' and 'tsotsi youth'
outside of the workplaces, but also their instability inside.
Migration, as often as possible, back to the rural areas, and wage
labour as a re-entry mechanism to these 'declining patchwork rural
slums'in the 'reserves', was also an attempt to control 'the
40 Mayer, P. op.cit., ch.9., Interviews, 3, G, June 1987.
41 Daily Dispatch, June 1956.
42 Interviews 3, C, Dec./Jan.1987., BCI, File 43.
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women', on whom their power and access to the rural areas rested to
a significant degree. So, women were resented and bemoaned as they
'made life more difficult', made work more real, and increasingly
they 'refused to listen'.43 The answer lay, in part, in re-
asserting patriarchal control, through wage labour,[in order to re-
assert production and control in the reserves] and ironically, its
avoidance, on a regular and systematic basis in order to retain
'manliness'and not become 'urbanized*.
Expected work routines were also upset by the 'iset:1 and
'amakhaya' [home-men] who would live, and work together as much as
was possible. The solidarities of kinship extended into a food
factory for example, where workers found a member of a rival kin
group employed in the processing section and refused to work while-
he remained.4-1 More generally, kinship asserted and re-informed mi-
grant attachments to particular rural areas, encouraged their con-
tinuance, and provided an identity that was not easily broken into
by the demands of 'stable and permanent native labour' in E.L. The
amakhaya also 'provided jobs'as both employers and associated
workers, and adopted the practises of 'encouraging family and close
tribal connections' amongst their workforces. This enabled job
selection, but also made it 'easier to go home and return later and
still have your job'.-15 It also meant that workers avoided 'heavy
work' and 'bad employers', through the solidarities of kinship,
when first arriving in E.L., or in desperation, and encouraged 'the
discretionary nature of the native job market on a significant
scale... bad employers feel their effects in particular... the
message goes out and some factories are known to be avoided in some
country areas.'46
Low wages were a major issue affecting the workplace and the
relations of work in the 1950's. Material work rewards simply did
not correspond to effort. Constant complaints and questioning of
underpayment, and that wages were not enough to live on, meant a
resistance to working that was expressed in as limited a participa-
tion as conditions allowed. But it went further. The dishonesty
identified with low wages exemplified the differences in material
and cultural life between white and black, and meant that
"a white employer who pays his native employees a small
wage is a very bad man; he is no better than a thief,
because he takes advantage ofthe fact that if you refuse
the pay there is another man who will take the job. Kith
this fact in mind you accept the small wage.The thing to
do then is to steal when the chance presents itself.It is
not sinful to steal from another thief... You cannot
force him to pay you a living wage;all you can do is get
your own back somehow...Is it wrong to take that which
belongs to you but which is being fraudulently retained
by your employer."47
The emergence of the 'isonka' system [of stealing to supplement
wages] became widely prevalent in E.L. in the 1950's, and was
greatly admired. It also was not seen as illegal, as 'the valuable
things that have been taken are not those of anybody I know. They
43 Daily Dispatch, Sept. 1955., Interviews, 3, S-U, June 1988.
44 Company Archives, Dec.1986..
45 BCI Boxes 6 and 7., Interviews, 3, R, June 1988.
46 BCI Boxes 6 and 7.
47 Mayer, P., op.cit. p.145.
belong to a white man, whose only connection with me is
employment'.48
A CRISIS IN PRODUCTION, THE EAST LONDON WORKING CLASS AND
APARTHEID.
In 1956/57 the growth of manufacturing capital slowed considerably
and contemporary industrialists began to talk of a crises of pro-
duction. One industrial report suggested
"the low quality of labour, a relatively recent
development is being experienced by the majority of
employers in the city...The results on their economic
performance is deeply disturbing...The inability of many
companies to reach targets can only have nagativelsic)
and far-reaching^consequences for the future." 19
The flurry of consultations, studies and reports by 'production
engineers' and 'effeciency experts' for a number of key manufac-
turing industries, reflected the need to increase and direct pro-
duction. Apart from linking 'strong and effective management' to
'labour discipline and control', to low productivity, the general-
ized conclusion was the necessity to convince 'native and coloured
labour* of the attractiveness and advantage of their conversion
into 'effecient', 'stable', 'reliable1, 'careful', and 'respon-
sible' producers.50
Importantly, this does not mean that capital in general in E.L. re-
sponded to the 'crises' of 1956/57 with a cohesive and comprehen-
sive process of transformation. Many of the smaller firms and work-
shops continued to rely on personalistic and arbitrary forms of
attempted workplace domination. There, the working day and its
regularization and extension, mattered for black workers, and for
the owners and their 'management team of family and supervisory
help'. If these firms survived, and at .least 30 didn't, they
emerged little changed in capital structure, in use of technology
and in productive capabilities by 1963.51 In terms of the
workplace though, and the nature of its occupation and stability,
'native labour ' was 'more strongly present, and more regularly
so'. But, importantly, the response, which saw the 'jelling' of
mass production ideology with practice, was the dominant one, and
thereafter it was these relations which gave classes in E.L. their
particular form.
It was the factories, whether dependent on 'the strength, skill,
quickness, and sureness of touch of the individual worker, the
brute strength and toil of the ganger, or the watchful, repetitive
and mechanized regulations of the operative on the line, that came
to dominate the industrial map of E.L. by 1963. The shortages of
black [and white] labour experienced in E.L. in the 1950's, re-
flective of the patterns of incomplete and partial proletarianiza-
tion, and the 'major element in the local stagnation of industry',
had been 'resolved' by 1963/64. In this process the emergent nature
of local class relations, their stabilization, and their so-
cialization were key.
48 Interview, 3, L, Jan.1988.
49 BCI Box 19.
50 Company Records, Dec, 1987.
51 BCI Box 21, Company Archives/Records, Dec. 1987.
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The most immediate and apparent response by manufacturing capital
to the 'labour problems' of the 1950's was the attempt to initiate
'new methods of organizing production' with new investment. In all
the major sectors the level of capital intensity increased in t&e
1956-1963 period, in places marginally, but in other factories,
dramatically. While it was suggested that this involved
'sophisticated and modern machines, comparable to the rest of tie
world'52 it was more accurately, and largely, second hsad
machinery, behind the rest of the 'advanced world'.53 Despite the
relatively high levels of capital investment, whatever its uaiare
and technolgical capabilities however, production, even in the ic—
ternational companies, was linked to the needs of large and cLejp
labour forces en a continuous basis. The sustained need for s=cfo
labour forces, and their productive incorporation and control vas 3
necessity, and in the post 19C7 period of "crises* a hard realiiy
that needed solutions.
For the older established firms, and Wilson Rovntree's is an ex-
cellent example, the 'artificial spaces' of labour shortage Io£~
white women and black men), together with the "rowing pressure of
'competitive advantage', pushed through
"the necessity to upgrade the factory, introduce labor-
saving and modern equipment and become competitive on the
national market. Modernization also has distinct
advantages in our quest for good native labour... A
modern factory will introduce modern and attractive
conditions under which it will labour."54
This captures an important dynamic linked to the mechanization uu£
restructuring of labour-processes in factories in E.L., as a re—
sponse to worker resistance to mass production. The establishment.
of more capital intensive forms of production entailed not siaalv
the de-skilling of white workers, but also the acquisition and ex-
perience of new skills for black workers. And new skills, along
with increased wages, benefits, better working conditions, and mare-
systematized and regular hours would mean greater responsibility
and a 'sense of belonging in the life of the factory".
The answers lay in the workplaces, although they appeared im the
form of the councillor, the magistrate, the policeman, and the
labour bureau official. Historically, segregation, through the lo—
cal state, and commercial capital, created the conditions for &
rigidly racially divided city, township slums, and the conception.
that the 'native' was a temporary working resident, subject tc as
much control and exclusion as was possible. Apartheid, after 1SI8.
had changed little of this by the mid-1950's, except for the state
to repressively intervene more centrally in the daily lives of"
E.L.'s black inhabitants. Manufacturing capital on the other haul,
had begun to challenge some of these realities, as far as economic;
concerns of labour markets, employment and labour stability neat-
Working largely outside the ambit of a national state with a w a t
institutional presence in E.L., and a paralysed local state ca«sh£
up in fighting industry itself and reviving a stagnant tourist
trade, manufacturers in the. early 1950's struggled to find their
52 BCI Box 21.
53 Company Records, Dec. 1987.
54 Company Records, Dec. 1987. The history of Wilson Rowntree's,
unpublished manuscript, 1961, at the E.L. Museum.
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own solutions. In this they were largely unsuccessful, due partly
to internal tensions and conflicts, partly to their weak and
'unattractive' economic base and lack of organizational presence,
and partly to their inability to intervene in the lives of black
East Londoners beyond the work-gates.55
In 1955/56 the manufacturers' reaching for solutions began to make
contacts, sometimes unintentionally, with practices of the
apartheid state in the region. The Ciskei and Transkei bantustans
both experienced significant decline in the 1950's, and by 1957
were little short of 'rural slums'. The importance of this is per-
haps best highlghted in the changing language of African migrant
and settled workers. The themes of 'country-rootedness and loyalty
to old cultural standards', of cattle, kraals, drought and ploughs,
wives and rural ceremonies, began to lose place to wages, work, and
township life, of radios and lounge suites, the cinema, the dance-
hall and the cricket club.56 Talk of changing needs, realities and
commodities suggests a fundamental process and pressure on work
stabilization. Jobs and wages became crucial to existence as the
decade wore on and as the apartheid state increasingly ensured that
alternative forms of access to rural means of production for
'commoners', disintegrated into dust, disease and death. Although
migration continued, it became, by the early 1960's, less regular,
more demanding and essentially transformed. In Peddie, or
Keiskammahoek, or ..., although the work clothes of the week or
month were discarded in favour of the 'fed peasant blanket', the
filth and squalor of the 'worst location in the whole union', to-
gether with the 7.00 am hooter were not that easily taken off,
washed out, or deafened.57
At the same time as the economic basis of local labour migration
was disintegrating, the apartheid state sought to institutionalize
migrancy, and 'limit' the permanently settled in E.L. In effect,
the local or district labour bureau, although established in 1952
under the 'Native Laws Amendment Act', only began to 'function'
significantly in 1957.58 Until then, it seems, despite central di-
rectives, the 'underground' or 'at the door' practice enabled the
employment of black labour from anywhere, not just the 'local Bantu
locations of the E.L. district1.59 The weak functioning of the bu-
reau was also apparent, with local official 'sanction', in the easy
avoidance of unnecessarily 'closed' protection of 'indolent local
labour at the expense of business effeciency'. After 1956/57,
however, 'outside' or 'non-prescribed service contracts', largely
applicable to Transkeian . migrants in this instance, were dramati-
cally tightened, and selectively enforced, possibly affecting up to
80% of cases arising.60
The processes of far more strictly 'administering' influx control
in E.L. after 1957, together with the increasing ability to allo-
cate labour to the 'heavy' and 'bad' industries, had the important
effect of stabilizing, selecting and redirecting the migrant, and
55 BCI Records, various files, esp. 55-63.
56 References from Mayer, P., Reader, D.H.,'The Black Man's
Portion', Oxford, 1961, Daily Dispatch in the 1950's, Pauw,
B.A. , 'The Second Generation', Oxford, 1963, and Interviews.
57 Interviews 3, C, L, M, Dec.1987.
58 Interviews, 4, A-F, December, 1988.
59 Ibid.
60 Mayer,P., op. cit. p.58, Daily Dispatch, December 1956.
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settled black labour market, on a significant scale. 'Sex-ten*
[Section 10 of the 1945 Natives Urban Areas Act ], based on birth,
residence, and continuous employment, and the pass system more
generally, formed the basis in E.L. [as elsewhere ] of segmenting
the labour market between temporary migrants and permanent resi-
dents, and securing the reproduction of differentiated forms of
labour power.61 But what 'se>:-ten' also did, was to reinforce the
necessity for wage labour on a stabilized and continuous basis for
black workers in E.L., especially after 1956. Section 10 was seen
as the 'law that compels a man to remain in his job for at least 10
years', and the law that 'marries us to our employers'.62 For
E.L.'s migrants it also took away 'the little freedom we had In
choice of job. Nowadays [1957/58] you are liable to be chased out
of town if you don't stick to your job, so you have just got ts
stick to it, even if it is a bad one and underpaid.' The threat cf
'endorsement out of town' within 11 days, once a 'work-seekers
permit' had been acquired, also hastened employment, forcing mi-
grants to take the first job offered, and to 'stick to it forever'.
This perceived 'unholy alliance' between employers and authorities,
served to both unify migrant and permanent workers, in their
antagonism to the pass system and to local capital, but also to
differentiate them in terms of status, work, and their place in
township life.63
In terms of this permanent/migrant unity, the popular local inte»—
pretation of the pass system, its origins, and its implementation,
was significant. Seen as a 'white device to keep the amaXhosii
down1, and as the 'cruelty of white people...making these laws
specially for us...I hate their way of oppressing us by these
passes, permits, and regulations', influx control was interpreted
as a deliberate punishment for the '1952 riots', as an outcome to
them and to prevent any further political activity that would
challenge 'whites'.64 In the day to day realities of life in
iMonti the deportations, raids, the lines of thousands of people
outside 'the office' renewing their lodgers permits every montti,
and 'the queues' of arrested pass / permit offenders, swollen by
regular additions, forcefully marching behind the policeman to the
police station, all reinforced, continuously, the fact that 'you go
to jail here for nothing at all...it has made this town a very bad
place'. The extent of daily repression, where everyone 'knows some-
one who has been arrested and fined, or expelled..."if it was not
the person themself, meant that the pass system and its enforcers,
after 1952, but especially after 1956/57, when these intensified,
under a more effecient and stream-lined police and bureau, served
to 'stabilize' black labour in jobs and township life. But it was
contradictory, unifying a need to 'hold onto a job', while pushing
migrants into unskilled and unwanted jobs through harsher and more
overt sanction, and bringing together a common opposition to 'white
authority', while more systematically affecting and arresting
migrant 'temporary residents' over 'permanents'. These divisions
suited the needs of a fractionalized local capital In
manufacturing, and in commerce and the state, and related to and
shaped a necessary fragmented local labour market and allocation of
black labour after 1957. And- it served to 'stabilize' this labour
market and the concerned workers in their workplaces.
61 BCI File 15.
62 Muncipal Records, ELM, 16/17/5., Mayer, op cit.
63 Letter from unspecified source to G.O. - personal archive.
64 Ibid., Interviews in Dec.1987 confirmed this interpretation.
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If people in Tsolo and Mekeni [sections of Duncan Village ] had no
problem in identifying that 'the work of a policeman is to raid our
homes late at night or early in the morning looking for permits,
liquor, passes, taxes, anything',65 there was a similar recog-
nition of political and trade union activity promoting equally
widespread responses from the police and authorities. Activists,
were harassed, strikes declared illegal, and strikers arrested in
1954, and in 1956 / 57 & 58.66 Union activity was also severely
curtailed under the Native Labour Act of 1953, which was 'very ac-
tively pursued after 1956 in the E.L. Regional Native Labour
Council/Committee's and the CNLB's activities'. Works and Liason
committees were formed in a number of factories,67 and in
particular the 'malpractises of agitators and so-called 'union'
leaders' were closely monitored, and stopped 'at all costs, from
serving their own selfish needs' and from making trade unionism
into 'a profession ...and not a service'.68 The active pursuance of
education of 'European employers', and the 'interpreting for the
Board the desires and aspirations of native workers ...to
settlement by negotiation... but not with strikers who were outside
the provisions of the Act', laid the basis for restricted union
activity, but also large scale state interventions into the life of
the factory.69 . Wages were kept down, increases 'negotiated'
through the NLC and the 'works committees' were minimal,' and
strikes made illegitimate, involving prosecution and more
importantly, instant dismissal. In this context Mr.Godlo's
pronouncement, that 'they were proud of the record of E.L. as
compared with other towns and ports, E.L. being the centre where
the workers achieved their ends peacefully', was a biting comment
on the effectivity of capital and the state to define 'the ends'
for workers in the late 1950's and early 1960's.70 And it was a
real reflection on how important, and how valued, jobs, and their
maintenance, had become by the 1960's, as is the memory of the
time:
"I sympathized with the union workers [ SACTU ] as did
many, I think, they worked very hard, tirelessly, but
they were too few and were always disappearing... To join
ha - no, no, that would have been the end ...no work,
no money, and standing then, waving the book at the
bosses for a job with hundreds of others ...too many
people looking for jobs then...If you had employment then
you were 'quick' and kept on it... unless you had the
assurance of one better ..."71
Unemployment, especially for the youth, but also more generally,
became significant in promoting increasing job security and limit-
ing labour turnover. Despite state intervention by the late
1950's, unemployment stood at "somewhere between 25% and 35%'. This
massive presence of 'so many workless' people kept wage levels low
and 'tied' workers to the jobs out of a real fear of becoming, and
realizing, like Norman Duka, that getting employed rested on
'luck', 'chance', and 'hoping to be seen by the white man with
65 Duka, N., 'From Shantytown to Forest', LSM Press, 1974.,p.24.
67 LIE 10 EL 4 / 8 / 7 / 3 .
67 Company Archives, Dec.1987
68 LIE 10 EL 4/8/7/3.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Interview, 3, H, Jan.1988.
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power'and thus on the arbitrary selective choice of the manager and
his assistant. It was also an experience of helpless frustation to
have to look for a job...
"Once I got the pass I began looking for a factory job.
The first day I went to Standard Canners. I found
hundreds of men, young boys, and women standing in front
 t
of the gates. It was very early and the factory hadn't *
opened yet... When the manager finally came out he chose
people near the front. He couldn't even see those of us
who stood and held up our passes at the back of the .-'•
crowd. I left and ran to another factory. Again, no luck. '•
Then to another, and another - I can't even remember how
many. I began to realize how difficult it was to get a
job; out all day, running from factory to factory arid
still no job. I returned home hungry and tired."72
.These pressures and pulses placed on black workers to 'hold onto
their jobs', from below, were also felt and influenced out at
'shantytown'. The poverty of life in the E.L. townships, and the-
very real material limits of low and inconsistent wages,
enormous pressure on leisure and a lifestyle already st
by a local state concerned with control 'and nothing else*. The-
shack areas of Mekeni, Tsolo, and Thulandivile were overcrowded and
squalid, places of 'great unhappiness and desperation*. Hose for &
family -was usually a single sub-let room, about 10-15 feet.
square.73 The muncipal housing areas, although less congested, were
also sub-let and squashed, earning for Duncan Village, the
reputation of the 'worst home in the union*. Even the cirtinfi
barracks were favourably compared to living in the shack areas of
Duncan Village.74 But better, permanent and secure incoues could,
after 1957, entail a movement out of the shack areas into the
'groups of plots in selected parts of the East Bank Location
[Duncan Village] so that they nay arise above the effluvium of"
slumdom'. [ D.V extension was the main site and by I960, 970 houses
had been built and 'sold' there.]75 There, people could live in a
house that 'whispers to you that it needs more furniture*, an*2
anticipate removing themselves from the curfews and controls of the-
tsotsi's, the daily raids of 'the authorities and police*, and
fear of dying children, the disgust of inadequate sanitation,
the instability of family and community life. Not all that
were successful, but the community desire was strong, and the-
openings provided by a secure job, and 'respectable behaviour".
After 1963 though, it was to be the lure of Mdantsane, the ne-w
Ciskei homeland township, to be 'built' by the central state f and
not the responsibility of the local muncipality ] that would ensnrs*
movement out of the 'ghetto' that was Duncan Village.76
The result' for manufacturing industry in the 1960's was a 'world o2"
labour' not made in the pre-determined and anticipated inages of
the 1940's. The factory floors were 'teeming with native labour* iEi
skilled and semi-skilled positions, as well as in the expected
unskilled positions. Job stability had been secured from outside
the workplaces, and not in the gratitude of material rewards, or so
it seemed. The solid core -of black workers, which numbered about
72 Duka, N., op. cit. , p.37.
73 Muncipal Records, 12/4/T.,Interviews, Jan.1988.
74 Interview, 3, J, Jan.1988.
75 Muncipal Records, 12/4/T.
76 Interviews, Jan.-Feb. 1988.
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30% of the labour force in the early 1950's, had risen to close on
70% in the. early 1960's. By 1962 labour turnover had
correspondingly declined to approximately 60%.77 The great di-
versity in labour process organization which had produced a system
of fragmented, localized, and unconnected labour markets in the
1940's and early 1950's, had given way to the mobilization andvfar
more coherent labour market of the early 1960's. Black workers and
their jobs were increasingly defined and dominated by a 'semi-
skilled' denominator, although this process was also segmented by
the continued importance and scale of manual work, and migrant
/permanent, and educated/ uneducated divisions influencing employ-
ment practices and giving meaning to work.
Significantly though, what was happening inside the factories and
workplaces of E.L. did not contradict the practices, of the
apartheid state in the region. In answer to the question of how
black workers were to 'build' the factories and workshops, the an-
swer for capital lay in the ideology of apartheid, which
'corresponded' to patterns already taking shape around the partic-
ular emergent racial divisions of labour of the 1950's. The struc-
ture of white supervisory and black operative and manual labour was
elaborated, deepened, and legitimized through the language of
colour. Apartheid provided that framework in a number of ways, and
did so, because in the 1950's it was still in the process of
formation, ideologically and on the ground.
Manufacturers and managers latched onto the ideas of segregation
and racial difference within apartheid and justified building the
racial divisions of labour that characterized the workplaces, ac-
cording to understood 'correct occupational positions for natives
in European owned cities'.78 At the same time capital was
demanding 'stronger supervision and control' to 'increase the
quality of native labour' and the 'quantity of production'. Strong
and clear racial division ensured jobs for whites, as supervisors,
and*- that an exclusive and blatant racism from supervisors was not
out of place. 'Kaffir' and 'baas' made the workplace easier to
control for them, through direct coercion and violence and through
a legitimation of characteristic stereotypes of black workers as
'lazy', 'cheeky', and 'too independent1', unreliable, careless and
ineffecient. 79
For capital, the institutional racism of apartheid, the pro?:imity
of 'their own homelands' increasingly realized in 'Bantu Self
Government' and in Mdantsane, the notions of 'temporary residents'
and the pass system, as well as wider political and community ex-
clusion, all confirmed a 'legimate' separateness of the ownership
and control of white industry. In the workplaces this all had a
base in the ways in which race patterned relations of production.
'Working' was for 'the white man', the 'expectation' of supervision
and direction came from whites, 'natives' did certain kinds of
work, were paid differently, had different needs and goals in work,
could deal with boring and repetitive work better, and were more
suited to hard and manual work.80 This all. meant that it was
'kaffir' and 'whiteman', not worker and boss that defined
'objective' class experiences. Racial divisions and stereotypes
77 BCI, Files 41 and 42.
78 Company Archives, BCI, Files 34 and 37.
79 Interviews, 3, D and G, 1987.
80 BCI, Files 37-38.
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served the interests of profitabilty through lower wages, through
being able to define skills as unskilled work, and through
'displacing ' and avoiding costs of labour reproduction. And it
served to stabilize and control the workplaces for white owners
and managers as the relations of exploitation were read in racial
terms, 'because of being black'.81
At every level race informed, reinforced and effectively fused with
class dispositions and practices. The nature and expectation cf
factory and other employment was pre-defined in racial terms, as
were wage levels, working conditions, the'content of supervision,
the conditions of leisure, and the ability to organize. So too were
the elements of shared and collective awareness, located initially
in tlie workplace. In all of this, race predominated. Experience
seemed to belie structure, as these processes promoted a racial
consciousness largely devoid of tangible class content in the
1960's in E.L.
The significance of this process of identification is that it was
largely shaped, at least initially, in the places of work. It was
extended, and more coherently 'interiorized' in local class rela-
tions from above, as a resolution of the inability of manufacturing
capital to socialize its relations of production. But equally
importantly, this process of the 'interiorization'of race in local
class relations reflected, for E.L.'s emerging working class, the
modality in which class was worked and lived. It was the way peo-
ple, as workers, defined and shaped their own lives, in the strug-
gle to give meaning to work in E.L. especially after cl957. The
experience of factory work, and the dominance of manufacturing
capital, did not break down these racial realities and conceptions,
it rather reinforced them. This had as much to do with the way
workers made sense of their changed realities and imposed their
conditions on the workplace, as it did to do with 'the desires'of
capital, or the pressures of the apartheid state. So,
"to be called 'kaffir' was to be • called a useless
uncivilized and accepting worker,... but to call oneself
an 'African' was to identify one self with pride and
assert one's rights and values as a working person"82
Central, then, was the attempt to make the economic relations of
industry in E.L. a human relationship through an assertion of the
opposites of capital/ state definitions, in the form of an ethnic
and at times national 'African' identity. This formed in practice
and in consciousness, but in non-collective and non-organizational
forms through the 1960's. Kays of expressing this, while
'oppositional' to the 'temporary resident' or 'obedient kaffir'
definition, were situational, assertive, and individualistic, but
also in a wider frame of reference, accomodative and consensual.
And they had to be, for the very relations of production to be ac-
cepted and socialized in E.L. .in the 1960's. This can be seen in
the recognitions of 'respectability and security' coming with 'hard
and reliable work', as did higher wages and better working
conditions, which were in turn a denial of 'how the whites could
only see you*. The ability to 'prove the white employer' and really
'do the job better than any of them could', the sense in which it
became important to 'stay with the job to get your rewards', and
recognition that you were not 'lazy and unreliable', as well as
81 Company Records, Dec. 1987.
82 Interview, 3, H, Dec.-Jan. 1987.
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less agreeable dimensions of being punctual, of 'working the
system1 and of 'holding your head up' all reflected this tension.83
These processes, in turn, implied an internalization, an
'acceptance' of apartheid, out of the economic realities of the
workplaces, beyond repression and control in E.L. The wheels of
industry, and of the state of the 1960's, turned on organizational
and union bannings, trials and exiles, on forced removals out of
Duncan Village, and on influx controls, pass arrests and 'sex-ten'
denials. They turned on the voluntary and forced growth of
Mdantsane, on Ciskei and Transkei 'self government', and on the
Border Industries Programme as it secured and expanded capital's
base in the region and in the muncipality. But underneath, they
turned on the 'silent' consent of a working class that had made
itself, as much as been made, in racial form, in the- content of the
workplaces of East London in the 1950's. This is the '...general
illumination in which all other colours are plunged, and which
modifies their specific tonalities. It is the special ether which
defines the specific gravity of everything found in it.'81
83 Company Interviews, and Records, BCI Box 33.
84 Marx,K. quoted in Thompson, E.P.,'Eighteenth-century English
society: class struggle without class?' in Social History, 3
[2] 1978, p.151. with obvious apology to both Marx, and
Thompson.
